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Abstract. The transferability of adversarial examples across deep neu-
ral network (DNN) models is the crux of a spectrum of black-box attacks.
In this paper, we propose a novel method to enhance the black-box trans-
ferability of baseline adversarial examples. By establishing a linear map-
ping of the intermediate-level discrepancies (between a set of adversarial
inputs and their benign counterparts) for predicting the evoked adver-
sarial loss, we aim to take full advantage of the optimization procedure of
multi-step baseline attacks. We conducted extensive experiments to ver-
ify the effectiveness of our method on CIFAR-100 and ImageNet. Experi-
mental results demonstrate that it outperforms previous state-of-the-arts
considerably. Our code is at https://github.com/qizhangli/ila-plus-plus.
Keywords: Adversarial Examples, Transferability, Feature Maps
1 Introduction
The adversarial vulnerability of deep neural networks (DNNs) has been exten-
sively studied over the years [34,8,25,3,24,1,11,10]. It has been demonstrated that
intentionally crafted perturbations, that are small enough to be imperceptible
to human eyes, on a natural image can fool advanced DNNs to make arbitrary
(incorrect) predictions. Along with this intriguing phenomenon, it is also pivotal
that the adversarial examples crafted on one DNN model can fail another with
a non-trivial success rate [34,8]. Such a property, called the transferability (or
generalization ability) of adversarial examples, plays a vital role in many black-
box adversarial scenarios [27,28], where the architecture and parameters of the
victim model is hardly accessible.
Endeavors have been devoted to studying the transferability of adversarial ex-
amples. Very recently, intermediate-layer attacks [41,18,15] have been proposed
to improve the transferability. It was empirically shown that larger mid-layer
disturbance (in feature maps) leads to higher transferability in general. In this
paper, we propose a new method for improving the transferability of adversarial
examples generated by any baseline attack, just like in [15]. Our method op-
erates on the mid-layer feature maps of a source model as well. It attempts to
take full advantage of the directional guides gathered at each step of the baseline
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attack, by maximizing the scalar projection on a spectrum of intermediate-level
discrepancies. The effectiveness of the method was testified on a variety of image
classification models on CIFAR-100 [20] and ImageNet [30], and we show that
it outperforms previous state-of-the-arts considerably.
2 Related Work
Adversarial attacks can be categorized into white-box attacks and black-box
attacks, according to how much information of a victim model is leaked to
the adversary [27]. Initial attempts of performing black-box attacks rely on
the transferability of adversarial examples [27,28,23]. Despite the excitement
about the possibility of performing attacks under challenging circumstances,
early transfer-based methods often suffer from low success rates, and thus an al-
ternative trail of research that estimates gradient from queries also becomes pros-
perity [4,16,17,9,26,36,2,38]. Nevertheless, there exist applications where queries
are difficult and costly to be issued to the victim models, and it is also observed
that some stateful patterns can be detected in such methods [5].
Recently, a few methods have been proposed to enhance the transferability
of adversarial examples, boosting the transfer-based attacks substantially. They
show that maximizing disturbance in intermediate-level feature maps instead
of the final cross-entropy loss delivers higher adversarial transferability. To be
more specific, Zhou et al. [41] proposed to maximize the discrepancy between
an adversarial example and its benign counterpart on DNN intermediate layers
and simultaneously reduce spatial variations of the obtained results. Requiring
a target example in addition, Inkawhich et al. [18] also advocated performing
attacks on the intermediate layers. The most related work to ours comes from
Huang et al. [15]. Their method works by maximizing the scalar projection of
the adversarial example onto a guided direction (which can be obtained by per-
forming one of many off-the-shelf attacks [8,21,24,7,41]) beforehand, on a specific
intermediate layer. Our method is partially motivated by Huang et al.’s [15]. It
is also proposed to enhances the adversarial transferability, yet our method takes
the whole optimization procedure of the baseline attacks rather than their final
results as guidelines. As will be discussed, we believe temporary results probably
provide more informative and more transferable guidance than the final result
of the baseline attack. The problem setting will be explained in the following
subsection.
2.1 Problem Setting
In this paper, we focus on enhancing the transferability of off-the-shelf attacks,
just like Huang et al.’s intermediate-level attack (ILA) [15]. We mostly consider
multi-step attacks which are generally more powerful on the source models. Sup-
pose that a basic iterative FGSM (I-FGSM) is performed a priori as the baseline
attack, we have
xadvt+1 = ΠΨ (x
adv
t + α · sgn(∇L(xadvt , y))), (1)
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in which Ψ is a presumed valid set for the adversarial examples and ΠΨ denotes a
projection onto the set, given xadv0 = x and its original prediction y. The typical
I-FGSM performs attacks after running Eq. (1) for p times to obtain the final
adversarial example xadvp . We aim to improve the success rate of the generated
adversarial example on some victim models whose architecture and parameters
are unknown to the adversary. As depicted in Fig. 1, the whole pipeline consists
of two phases. The first phase is to perform the baseline attack just as normal,
precursor to the enhancement phase where our method or ILA can be applied.
Baseline Attack
(e.g., I-FGSM)
(Intermediate-level discrepancy)
(Input)
Our Method
Our Method
Baseline Attack Our Method
(Update)
Fig. 1. Pipeline of our method for enhancing the black-box transferability of adversarial
examples, which is comprised of two sequential phases, one for performing the baseline
attack (e.g., I-FGSM [21], PGD [24], MI-FGSM [7], etc) and the other for enhancing
the baseline result xadvp . In particular, the chartreuse-yellow background in hadvp −hadv0
on the left heatmap indicates a much lower disturbance than that in hadv−hadv0 on the
right. The discrepancies of feature maps are illustrated from a spatial size of 14× 14.
3 Our Method
As has been mentioned, adversarial attacks are mounted by maximizing some
prediction loss, e.g., the cross-entropy loss [8,24] and the hinged logit-difference
loss [3]. The applied prediction loss, which is dubbed adversarial loss in this
paper, describes how likely the input shall be mis-classified by the current model.
For introducing our method, we will first propose a new objective function that
utilizes the temporary results xadv0 . . .xadvt . . .xadvp−1 as well as the final result xadvp
of a multi-step attack that takes p+ 1 optimization steps in total, e.g., I-FGSM
whose update rule is introduced in Eq. (1).
We also advocate mounting attacks on an intermediate layer of the source
model, just like prior arts [41,18,15]. Concretely, given xadvt as a (possibly adver-
sarial) input, we can get the mid-layer output hadvt = g(xadvt ) ∈ Rm and the ad-
versarial loss lt := L(xadvt , y) from the source model with L(·, ·), at a specific in-
termediate layer. With a multi-step baseline attack running for a sufficiently long
period of time, we can collect a set of intermediate-level discrepancies (i.e.,
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“perturbations” of feature maps) and adversarial loss values {(hadvt − hadv0 , lt)},
and further establish a direct mapping of the intermediate-level discrepancies to
predicting the adversarial loss. For instance, a linear (regression) model can be
obtained by simply solving a regularized problem.
min
w
p∑
t=0
(wT (hadvt − hadv0 )− lt)2 + λ‖w‖2, (2)
in which w ∈ Rm is the parameter vector to be learned. The above optimization
problems can be written in a matrix/vector form: minw ‖r−Hw‖2 + λ‖w‖2, in
which the t-th row of H ∈ R(p+1)×m is (hadvt − hadv0 )T and the t-th entry of r ∈
Rp+1 is lt. The problem has a closed-form solution: w∗ = (HTH+ λIm)−1HT r.
Rather than maximizing the conventional cross-entropy loss as in FGSM [8],
I-FGSM [21], and PGD [24], we opt to optimizing
max
∆x
(g(x + ∆x)− hadv0 )Tw∗, s.t. (x + ∆x) ∈ Ψ (3)
to generate pixel-level perturbations with maximum expected adversarial loss in
the sense of the established mapping from the feature space to the loss space.
Both one-step (e.g., FGSM) and multi-step algorithms (e.g., I-FGSM and PGD)
can be used to naturally solve the optimization problem (3). Here we mostly con-
sider the multi-step algorithms, and as will be explained, our method actually
boils down to ILA [15] in a one-step case. Note that the intermediate-level feature
maps are extremely high dimensional. The matrix (HTH + λIm) ∈ Rm×m thus
becomes very high dimensional as well, and calculating its inverse is computa-
tional demanding, if not infeasible. While on the other hand, multi-step baseline
attacks only update for tens or at most hundreds of iterations in general, and
we have p m. Therefore, we utilize the Woodbury identity
HTH + λIm =
1
λ
I − 1
λ2
HT (
1
λ
HHT + Ip)
−1H
=
1
λ
I − 1
λ
HT (HHT + λIp)
−1H
(4)
so as to calculate the matrix inverse of (HHT + λIp) instead, for gaining higher
computational efficiency. We can then rewrite the derived optimization problem
in Eq. (3) as
max
∆x
(g(x + ∆x)− hadv0 )T (Ip −HT (HHT + λIp)−1H)HT r,
s.t. (x + ∆x) ∈ Ψ.
(5)
It is worth mentioning that, with a drastically large “regularizing" parameter
λ, we have HT (HHT+λI)−1H ≈ 0 and, in such a case, the optimization problem
in Eq. (5) approximately boils down to: max∆x (g(x+∆x)−hadv0 )THT r. If only
the intermediate-level discrepancy evoked by the final result xadvp along with its
corresponding adversarial loss is used in the optimization (or a single-step base-
line attack is applied), the optimization problem is mathematically equivalent
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to that considered by Huang et al. [15], making their ILA a special case of our
method. In fact, the formulation of our method suggests a maximized projection
on a linear combination of the intermediate-level discrepancies, which are de-
rived from the temporary results xadv0 . . .xadvt . . .xadvp−1 and the final result xadvp
of the multi-step baseline attack. Since the temporary results possibly provide
complementary guidance to the final result, our method can be more effective.
In (3) and (5), we encourage the perturbation g(x + ∆x) − hadv0 on feature
maps to align with w∗, to gain more powerful attacks on the source model. In the
meanwhile, the magnitude of the intermediate-level discrepancy ‖g(x + ∆x) −
hadv0 ‖ is anticipated to be large to improve the transferability of the generated
adversarial examples, as also advocated in ILA. Suppose that we are given two
directional guides that would lead to similar adversarial loss values on the source
model, yet remarkably different intermediate-level disturbance via optimization
using for instance ILA. One may anticipate the one that causes larger disturbance
in an intermediate layer to show better black-box transferability. Nevertheless,
it is not guaranteed that the final result of the baseline attack offers an exciting
prospect of achieving satisfactory intermediate-level disturbance in the followup
phase. By contrast, our method endows the enhancement phase some capacities
of exploring a variety of promising directions and their linear combinations that
trade off the adversarial loss on the source model and the black-box transferabil-
ity. Experimental results in Section 4.3 shows that our method indeed achieves
more significant intermediate-level disturbance in practice.
3.1 Intermediate-level Normalization
In practice, the intermediate-level discrepancies at different timestamps t and t′
during a multi-step attack have very different magnitude, varying from ∼ 0 to
≥ 100 for CIFAR-100. To take full advantage of the intermediate-level discrepan-
cies in Eq. (3), we suggest performing data normalization before solving the linear
regression problem. That being said, we suggest w˜∗ = (H˜T H˜ + λIm)−1H˜T r, in
which the t-th row of the matrix H˜ is the normalized intermediate-level discrep-
ancy (hadvt − hadv0 )/‖hadvt − hadv0 ‖ obtained at the t-th iteration of the baseline
attack. We here optimize a similar problem as in Eq. (3), i.e.,
max
∆x
(g(x + ∆x)− hadv0 )T w˜∗, s.t. (x + ∆x) ∈ Ψ, (6)
as both (g(x+∆x)−h
adv
0 )
T w˜∗
‖g(x+∆x)−hadv0 ‖
and ‖g(x+∆x)−hadv0 ‖ are expected to be maximized.
4 Experimental Results
In this section, we show experimental results to verify the efficacy of our method.
We will first compare the usefulness of different intermediate-level discrepancies
when being applied as the directional guides in our framework and ILA, and then
compare plausible settings of our method on CIFAR-100. We will show that our
method significantly outperforms its competitors on CIFAR-100 and ImageNet
in Section 4.3. Our experimental setting are deferred to Section 4.4.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2. How the transferability of the baseline adversarial example (a) crafted on VGG-
19 to attack WRN (enhanced by ILA or not) and (b) crafted on WRN to attack VGG-
19 (enhanced by ILA or not) varies with p. The dashed lines indicate the performance
with the optimal p values. We see that the most transferable I-FGSMp+ILA examples
( = 0.03) are obtained around p = 10, and the success rate declines consistently with
greater p for p ≥ 10.
4.1 Delve into the Multi-step Baseline Attacks
We conducted a comprehensive study on the adversarial transferability of con-
temporary results in multi-step baseline attacks and how competent they are in
assisting subsequent methods like ILA [15] and ours. We performed experiments
on CIFAR-100 [20], an image classification dataset that consisting of 60 000 im-
ages from 100 classes. It was officially divided into a training set of 50 000 images
and a test set of 10 000 images. We considered two models in this study: VGG-
19 [32] with batch normalization [19] and wide ResNet (WRN) [39], (specifically,
WRN-28-10). Their architectures are very different, since the latter is equipped
with skip connections and it is much deeper than the former. We collected pre-
trained models from Github 3, and they show 28.05% and 18.14% prediction
errors respectively on the official test set. We randomly chose 3000 images that
could be correctly classified by the two models to initialize the baseline attack,
and the success rate over 3000 crafted adversarial examples was considered.
We applied I-FGSM as the baseline attack and utilized adversarial examples
crafted on one model (i.e., VGG-19/WRN) to attack the other (i.e., WRN/VGG-
19). We tested the success rate when: (1) directly adopting the generated I-FGSM
adversarial examples on the victim models and (2) adopting ILA on the basis of
I-FGSM. Untargeted attacks were performed under a constraint of the `∞ norm
with  = 0.03. We denote by I-FGSMp the results of I-FGSM running for p steps,
and denote by I-FGSMp+ILA the ILA outcomes on the basis of I-FGSMp. The
success rates of using one model to attack the other are summarized in Fig. 2,
with varying p. Apparently, ILA operates better with relatively earlier results
from I-FGSM (i.e., I-FGSMp with a relatively smaller p). The most transferable
adversarial examples can be gathered around p = 10 when it is equipped with
ILA, and further increasing p would lead to declined success rates. While without
ILA, running more I-FGSM iterations are more beneficial to the transferability.
3 https://github.com/bearpaw/pytorch-classification
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3. How the transferability of I-FGSM adversarial examples, (a) crafted on VGG-
19 to attack WRN and (b) crafted on WRN to attack VGG-19, are enhanced by ILA.
We let  = 0.03.
In more detail, Fig. 3 shows how much the transferability is improved along
with ILA.We see that I-FGSM10+ILA consistently outperforms I-FGSM100+ILA.
We evaluated the performance of our method based on I-FGSMp examples sim-
ilarly, and the results are illustrated in Fig. 4 and 5, one with intermediate-level
normalization and the other without. We set λ→∞, and how the performance
of our method varies with λ will be discussed in Section 4.2. Obviously, the
same tendency as demonstrated in Fig. 3 can also be observed in Fig. 4 and 5.
That being said, earlier results from the multi-step baseline attack I-FGSM are
more effective as guide directions for both ILA and our method. As illustrated in
Fig. 2, the baseline attack converges faster than expected, making many “training
samples” in {(hadvt − hadv0 , lt)} highly correlated, with or without intermediate-
level normalization. Using relatively early results relieve the problem and is thus
beneficial to our method. The performance gain on ILA further suggests that
earlier results from I-FGSM overfit less on the source model, and they are more
suitable as the directional guides. In what follows, we fix p = 10 without any
further clarification, which also reduces the computational complexity of our
method for calculating w∗ or w˜∗ (by at least 10×), in comparison with p = 100.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. How the transferability of I-FGSM examples, (a) crafted on VGG-19 to attack
WRN and (b) crafted on WRN to attack VGG-19, are enhanced by our method. The
range of the y axes are kept the same as in Fig. 3 for easy comparison. We let  = 0.03.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 5. How the transferability of I-FGSM examples, (a) crafted on VGG-19 to at-
tack WRN and (b) crafted on WRN to attack VGG-19, are enhanced by our method.
Intermediate-level normalization is NOT performed. The range of the y axes are kept
the same as with Fig. 3 and 4 for easy comparison. We let  = 0.03.
Notice that the ranges of the vertical axes are the same for Fig. 3, 4, and 5.
It can easily be observed from the figures that our method, with either p = 10
or p = 100, achieves superior performance in comparison with ILA in the same
setting. With p = 1, the two methods demonstrate exactly the same results, as
has been discussed in Section 3. More comparative studies will be conducted in
Section 4.3. Based on I-FGSM10, our method shows a success rate of 85.53% with
normalization and 85.27% without, when attacking VGG-19 using WRN. That
being said, the intermediate-level normalization slightly improves our method,
and we will keep it for all the experiments in the sequel of the paper.
4.2 Our Method with Varying λ
One seemingly important hyper-parameter in our method is λ, which controls
the smoothness of the linear regression model with w∗ or w˜∗. Here we report the
performance with varying λ values and evaluate how different choices for λ affects
the final result. The experiment was also performed on CIFAR-100. To make the
study more comprehensive, we tested with a few more victim models, including
a ResNeXt, a DenseNet, and a convolutional network called GDAS [6] 4 whose
architecture is learned via neural architecture search [42,40]. We used VGG-19 as
the source model and the others (i.e., WRN, ResNeXt, DenseNet, and GDAS) as
victim models. Obviously in Fig. 6, small λ values lead to unsatisfactory success
rates on the source and victim models, and relatively large λs (even approaching
infinity) share similar performance. Specifically, the optimal average success rate
79.55% is obtained with λ = 10, while we can still get 79.38% with λ → ∞.
Here we would like to mention that, with the Woodbury identity and a scaling
factor 1/λ in Eq. (4) being eliminated when it is substituted into (5), we have
HT (HHT + λI)−1H→ 0, but NOT w∗ → 0 or w˜∗ → 0.
As has been discussed in Section 3, setting an infinitely large λ leads to a
simpler optimization problem and lower computational cost when computing the
4 https://github.com/D-X-Y/AutoDL-Projects
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Fig. 6. How the performance of our method varies with λ. The dotted lines indicates
the success rates when setting λ→∞. We let  = 0.03.
parameters of the linear mapping. In particular, the calculation of matrix inverse
can be omitted with λ→∞. Although not empirically optimal, letting λ→∞
leads to decent performance of our method, hence in the following experiments
we fixed the setting and solved the optimization problem in Eq. (5) instead
of (3) to keep the introduced computational burden on the intermediate layer
at a lower level. As such, the main computational cost shall come from back-
propagation, which is inevitable in ILA as well. We compare the run-time of our
method with that of ILA on both CPU and GPU in Table 1, where how long it
takes to craft 100 adversarial examples on the VGG-19 source model by using
the two methods is reported. The experiment was performed on an Intel Xeon
Platinum CPU and an NVIDIA Tesla-V100 GPU. The code was implemented
using PyTorch [29]. For fair comparison, the two methods were both executed
for 100 iterations for generating a single adversarial example. It can be seen that
both methods show similar run-time in practice.
Table 1. Run-time comparison between our method and ILA.
CPU (s) GPU (s)
ILA [15] 70.073 2.336
Ours 71.708 2.340
4.3 Compare with The State-of-the-arts
In this subsection, we show more experimental results to verify the effectiveness
of our method. We tried attacking 14 models on CIFAR-100 and ImageNet, 4
for the former and 10 for the latter. For CIFAR-100, the victim models include
WRN, ResNeXt, DenseNet, and GDAS, as previously introduced, while for Ima-
geNet, the tested victim models include VGG-19 [32] with batch normalization,
ResNet-152 [12], Inception v3 [33], DenseNet [14], MobileNet v2 [31], SENet [13],
ResNeXt [37] (precisely ResNeXt-101-32x8d), WRN [39] (precisely WRN-101-
2), PNASNet [22], and MNASNet [35]. The source models for the two datasets
are VGG-19 and ResNet-50, respectively. Pre-trained models on ImageNet are
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Table 2. Performance of transfer-based attacks on CIFAR-100 using I-FGSM with an
`∞ constraint of the adversarial perturbation in the untargeted setting. The symbol *
indicates when the source model is the target. The best average results are in red.
Dataset Method  VGG-19* WRN ResNeXt DenseNet GDAS Average
CIFAR-100
-
0.1 100.00% 74.90% 69.33% 71.77% 66.93% 70.73%
0.05 100.00% 64.67% 57.63% 61.13% 56.00% 59.86%
0.03 100.00% 48.27% 41.20% 43.83% 39.13% 43.11%
ILA [15]
0.1 99.07% 97.53% 96.90% 97.30% 96.03% 96.94%
0.05 99.03% 93.90% 90.73% 91.60% 88.73% 91.24%
0.03 98.77% 82.73% 76.53% 77.87% 72.83% 77.49%
Ours
0.1 98.83% 97.80% 97.07% 97.50% 96.51% 97.22%
0.05 98.87% 94.03% 91.27% 91.73% 89.37% 91.60%
0.03 98.53% 84.57% 78.70% 79.60% 74.63% 79.38%
Table 3. Performance of transfer-based attacks on ImageNet using I-FGSM with `∞
constraint in the untargeted setting. We use the symbol * to indicate when the source
model is used as the target. The lower sub-table is the continuation of the upper sub-
table. The best average results are marked in red.
Dataset Method  ResNet-50* VGG-19 ResNet-152 Inception v3 DenseNet MobileNet v2
ImageNet
-
0.1 100.00% 67.70% 61.10% 36.36% 65.00% 65.60%
0.05 100.00% 54.46% 44.74% 24.68% 49.90% 52.12%
0.03 100.00% 36.80% 26.56% 13.72% 32.08% 34.56%
ILA [15]
0.1 99.96% 97.62% 96.96% 87.94% 96.76% 96.54%
0.05 99.96% 88.74% 86.02% 61.20% 86.42% 85.62%
0.03 99.96% 69.96% 63.14% 34.86% 64.52% 65.68%
Ours
0.1 99.92% 97.60% 96.98% 88.46% 97.02% 96.74%
0.05 99.92% 89.40% 87.12% 64.96% 88.14% 86.98%
0.03 99.90% 72.88% 67.82% 39.40% 68.38% 69.20%
Dataset Method  SENet ResNeXt WRN PNASNet MNASNet Average
ImageNet
-
0.1 45.32% 56.36% 56.96% 35.34% 63.68% 55.34%
0.05 29.92% 41.74% 40.82% 22.76% 49.46% 41.06%
0.03 15.94% 23.46% 24.32% 11.90% 33.12% 25.25%
ILA [15]
0.1 93.76% 96.00% 95.62% 91.04% 96.70% 94.89%
0.05 74.36% 82.54% 81.80% 65.74% 84.32% 79.68%
0.03 46.50% 59.24% 58.58% 37.22% 64.78% 56.45%
Ours
0.1 94.00% 96.16% 95.74% 91.22% 96.86% 95.08%
0.05 76.26% 84.00% 83.50% 69.24% 86.26% 81.59%
0.03 50.26% 63.48% 62.72% 42.16% 67.94% 60.42%
collected from Github5 and the torchvision repository6. We mostly compare our
method with ILA, since the two share the same problem setting as introduced in
Section 2.1. We first compare their performance on the basis of I-FGSM, which
is viewed as the most basic baseline attack in the paper. Table 2 and 3 summa-
rize the results on CIFAR-100 and ImageNet, respectively. It can be seen that
our method outperforms ILA remarkably on almost all test cases. As has been
explained, both methods work better with relatively earlier I-FGSM results. The
results in Table 2 and 3 are obtained with p = 10. We also tested with p = 100,
30, and 20, and our method is superior to ILA in all these settings. Both methods
chose the same intermediate layer according to the procedure introduced in [15].
5 https://github.com/Cadene/pretrained-models.pytorch
6 https://github.com/pytorch/vision/tree/master/torchvision/models
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Table 4. Performance of transfer-based attacks on ImageNet. Different baseline attacks
are compared in the same setting of  = 0.03. The best average result is marked in red.
MI-FGSM [7] PGD [24] TAP [41]
- ILA [15] Ours - ILA [15] Ours - ILA [15] Ours
ResNet-50* 100.00% 99.94% 99.90% 100.00% 99.94% 99.88% 100.00% 99.98% 99.96%
VGG-19 46.46% 67.18% 70.28% 40.80% 70.38% 72.22% 58.34% 78.00% 77.96%
ResNet-152 37.90% 60.76% 63.62% 31.06% 64.32% 68.02% 45.04% 67.42% 68.52%
Inception v3 21.50% 33.98% 37.26% 16.60% 37.76% 41.52% 25.50% 40.70% 42.88%
DenseNet 42.14% 63.02% 65.86% 37.78% 67.14% 69.94% 49.02% 70.56% 71.98%
MobileNet v2 45.78% 63.92% 67.04% 39.02% 66.62% 69.66% 54.98% 72.72% 73.84%
SENet 24.60% 45.26% 48.14% 18.28% 46.32% 49.60% 33.68% 55.30% 56.26%
ResNeXt 34.28% 56.08% 59.64% 27.78% 60.16% 63.72% 41.30% 64.50% 66.20%
WRN 34.20% 56.28% 59.66% 27.92% 60.08% 62.82% 45.08% 66.24% 67.06%
PNASNet 18.36% 34.82% 38.56% 13.82% 38.50% 42.68% 22.20% 42.24% 44.76%
MNASNet 43.26% 62.34% 65.36% 37.08% 65.08% 67.76% 53.64% 71.64% 72.64%
Average 34.85% 54.36% 57.54% 29.01% 57.64% 60.79% 42.88% 62.93% 64.21%
In addition to ILA, there exist several other methods in favor of black-box
transferability, yet most of them are orthogonal to our method and ILA and they
can be applied as baseline attacks in a similar spirit to the I-FGSM baseline. We
tried adopting the two methods based on PGD [24], TAP [41], and I-FGSM with
momentum (MI-FGSM) [7], which are probably more powerful than I-FGSM.
Their default setting all choose the cross-entropy loss for optimization with an
`∞ constraint. In fact, I-FGSM can be regarded as a special case of the PGD
attack with a random restart radius of zero. TAP and MI-FGSM are specifically
designed for transfer-based black-box attacks and the generated adversarial ex-
amples generally show better transferability than the I-FGSM examples. Table 4
shows that TAP outperforms the other three (including the basic I-FGSM) multi-
step baselines. MI-FGSM and PGD are the second and third best, while the basic
I-FGSM performs the worst in the context of adversarial transferability without
further enhancement. Nevertheless, when further equipped with our method or
ILA for transferability enhancement, PGD and I-FGSM become the second and
third best, respectively, and TAP is still the winning solution showing 64.21%
success rates. The MI-FGSM-related results imply that introducing momentum
leads to less severe overfitting on the source model, yet such a benefit diminishes
when being used as directional guides for ILA and our method. Whatever base-
line attack is applied, our method always outperforms ILA in our experiment,
which is conducted on ImageNet with  = 0.03.
It can be observed from all results thus far that our method bears a slightly
decreased success rate on the source model, yet it delivers an increased capability
of generating transferable adversarial examples. It is discussed in Section 3 that
our method provides an advantage over the status quo that it is not guaranteed to
achieve optimal intermediate-level disturbance. To further analyze the function-
ality of our method, we illustrate the cross-entropy loss and intermediate-level
disturbance on the ImageNet adversarial examples crafted using our method
and ILA in Fig. 7. It depicts that our method gives rise to larger intermediate-
level disturbance in comparison to ILA, with a little sacrifice of the adversarial
loss. As has been explained, more significant intermediate-level disturbance indi-
12 Q. Li?, Y. Guo†, H. Chen
cates higher transferability in general, which well-explains the superiority of our
method in practice. Fig. 7 also demonstrates the slightly deteriorating effect on
the performance of our method in the white-box setting, which does not really
matter under the considered threat model though.
(a) (b)
Fig. 7. Comparison of our method and ILA in the sense of (a) the cross-entropy loss
and (b) intermediate-level disturbance on the ResNet-50 source model on ImageNet.
The success of our method is ascribed to effective aggregations of diverse di-
rectional guides over the whole procedure of the given baseline attack. Obviously,
it seems also plausible to ensemble different baseline attacks to gain even better
results in practice, since this probably gives rise to a more informative and suffi-
cient “training set” for predicting the adversarial loss linearly. To experimentally
testify the conjecture, we directly collected 20 intermediate-level discrepancies
and their corresponding adversarial loss from two of the introduced baseline at-
tacks: I-FGSM and PGD, for learning the linear regression model, i.e., 10 from
each of them, and we tested our method similarly. We evaluated the performance
of such an straightforward ensemble on ImageNet and it shows an average suc-
cess rate of 62.82% under  = 0.03. Apparently, it is superior to that using the
I-FGSM (60.42%) or PGD (60.79%) baseline results solely.
Fig. 8. Comparison of our method and ILA on CIFAR-100 with varying choices of the
intermediate layer (on the VGG-19 source model) to calculate the intermediate-level
discrepancies. Best viewed in color. We tested under  = 0.03.
Since λ→∞ was set, our method did not fine-tune more hyper-parameters
compared to ILA. A crucial common hyper-parameter of the two methods is the
location where the intermediate-level discrepancies are calculated. We compare
them with various settings of the location on CIFAR-100 in Fig. 8. It can be seen
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that our method consistently outperforms ILA in almost all test cases from the
first to the 13-th layer on the source model VGG-19. Both methods achieve their
optimal results at the same location, therefore we can use the same procedure for
selecting layers as introduced in ILA. The results on DenseNet are very similar
to those on ResNeXt, and thus not plotted for clearer illustration. Notice that
even the worst results of the intermediate-level methods on these victim models
are better than the baseline results. The ImageNet results on three representa-
tive victim models are given in Fig. 9, and the same conclusions can be made.
For CIFAR-100, the intermediate-level discrepancies were calculated right after
each convolutional layer, while for ImageNet, we calculated at the end of each
computational block.
Fig. 9. Comparison of our method and ILA on ImageNet with varying choices of the
intermediate layer (on the ResNet-50 source model) to calculate the intermediate-level
discrepancies. The index of layer shown as “3-1” indicates the first block of the third
meta-block. Best viewed in color. We tested under  = 0.03.
4.4 Experimental Settings and `2 attacks
We mostly consider untargeted `∞ attacks in the black-box setting, just like prior
arts of our particular interest [15,18,41]. The element-wise maximum allowed
perturbation, i.e., the `∞ norm, was constrained to be lower than a positive scalar
. We tested with  = 0.1, 0.05, and 0.03 in our experiments. In addition to the `∞
attacks, `2 attacks were also tested and the same conclusions could be made, i.e.,
our method still outperforms ILA and the original baseline considerably. Owing
to the space limit of the paper, we only report some representative results here.
On CIFAR-100, the I-FGSM baseline achieves an average success rate of 47.23%,
based on which ILA and our method achieve 73.73% and 75.78%, respectively. To
be more specific, on the victim models including VGG-19*, our method achieves
81.27% (for WRN), 75.4% (for ResNeXt), 75.60% (for DenseNet), 70.83% (for
GDAS), and 97.73% (for VGG-19*) success rates. On ImageNet, our method is
also remarkably superior to the two competitors in the sense of the average `2
success rate (ours: 76.73%, ILA: 74.68%, and the baseline: 54.79%). The same
victim models as in Table 3 were used. On CIFAR-100 and ImageNet, the `2 norm
of the perturbations was constrained to be lower than 1.0 and 10, respectively.
In `∞ cases, the step-size for I-FGSM, PGD, TAP, and MI-FGSM were uni-
formly set as 1/255, on both CIFAR-100 and ImageNet, while in `2 cases, we used
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0.1 and 1.0 on the two datasets respectively. Other hyper-parameters were kept
the same for all methods under both the `∞ and `2 constraints. We randomly
sampled 3000 and 5000 test images that are correctly classified by the victim
models from the two datasets respectively to initialize the baseline attacks and
generate 3000 and 5000 adversarial examples using each method, as suggested in
many previous works in the literature. For CIFAR-100, they were sampled from
the official test set consisting of 10 000 images, while for ImageNet, they were
sampled from the validation set. We run our method and ILA for 100 iterations
on the two datasets, such that they both reached performance plateaux. Input im-
ages to all DNNs were re-scaled to [0, 1] and the default pre-processing pipeline
was adopted when feeding images to the DNNs. For ILA and TAP, followed the
open-source implementation from Huang et al. [15]. An optional setting for im-
plementing transfer-based attacks is to save the adversarial examples as bitmap
images (or not) before feeding them to the victim models. The adversarial exam-
ples will be in an 8-bit image format for the former and a 32-bit floating-point
format for the latter. We consider the former to be more realistic in practice.
Our learning objective does not employ an explicit term for encouraging large
norms of the intermediate-level discrepancies. It is possible to further incorporate
one such term in (3) and (5). However, an additional hyper-parameter will be in-
troduced inevitably, as discussed by ILA regarding the flexible loss [15]. We shall
consider such a formulation in future work. Our code is at https://github.com/
qizhangli/ila-plus-plus.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a novel method for improving the transferabil-
ity of adversarial examples. It operates on baseline attack(s) whose optimization
procedures can be analyzed to extract a set of directional guides. By establishing
a linear mapping to estimating the adversarial loss using intermediate-layer fea-
ture maps, we have developed an adversarial objective function that could take
full advantage of the baseline attack(s). The effectiveness of our method has been
shown via comprehensive experimental studies on CIFAR-100 and ImageNet.
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